--- id: "/tags/security-red-teaming/page/2/" title: "Security Red Teaming · page 2" creator: null creator_url: null creator_x: null url: "https://skillissue.dev/tags/security-red-teaming/page/2/" level: null level_max: null category: null subcategory: null region: null license: null license_scope: null access: null models: null source_date: null date_added: null resource_kind: null verification_basis: null access_evidence: null domain_top: null domain_sub: null last_verified: null --- # Security Red Teaming [Beginner](/levels/beginner/index.md) [Intermediate](/levels/intermediate/index.md) [Advanced](/levels/advanced/index.md) [Expert](/levels/expert/index.md) 51 resources · page 2 of 2 - ### [NIST AI 100-2 Adversarial ML taxonomy](/security-and-red-teaming/safety-and-alignment-evals/nist-ai-100-2-adversarial-ml-taxonomy/index.md) Creator not supplied; see original source. NIST AI 100-2 report: taxonomy and terminology of adversarial machine learning attacks and mitigations. Intermediate–Advanced · unknown · unknown resource · en - ### [OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026](/security-and-red-teaming/safety-and-alignment-evals/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-2026/index.md) Creator not supplied; see original source. OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026: list of security risks specific to AI agents. Intermediate · unknown · unknown resource · en - ### [From Naptime to Big Sleep: Using Large Language Models To Catch Vulnerabilities In Real-World Code](/security-and-red-teaming/safety-and-alignment-evals/project-zero-from-naptime-to-big-sleep/index.md) Creator not supplied; see original source. Google Project Zero post on Big Sleep, an LLM agent that found an exploitable SQLite vulnerability in real code. Intermediate · unknown · unknown resource · en - ### [promptfoo docs: OWASP LLM Top 10 red teaming](/security-and-red-teaming/safety-and-alignment-evals/promptfoo-owasp-llm-top-10-red-teaming/index.md) Creator not supplied; see original source. Promptfoo documentation mapping its red-teaming plugins to the OWASP LLM Top 10 risks. Intermediate · unknown · unknown resource · en - ### [Red Teaming LMs to Reduce Harms (Ganguli et al.)](/security-and-red-teaming/safety-and-alignment-evals/red-teaming-lms-to-reduce-harms-ganguli-et-al/index.md) Creator not supplied; see original source. arXiv paper (2022) by Anthropic on red teaming language models: methods, scaling behaviour and a released attack dataset. Intermediate · unknown · unknown resource · en - ### [Redwood Research](/security-and-red-teaming/safety-and-alignment-evals/redwood-research/index.md) Creator not supplied; see original source. Redwood Research page listing its research on AI control and keeping AI systems aligned with developer intent. Intermediate–Advanced · unknown · unknown resource · en - ### [Simon Willison on prompt-injection](/security-and-red-teaming/safety-and-alignment-evals/simon-willison-prompt-injection-tag/index.md) Creator not supplied; see original source. Simon Willison's prompt-injection tag: running record of prompt-injection attacks and incidents since 2022. Intermediate · unknown · unknown resource · en - ### [The lethal trifecta for AI agents (Simon Willison)](/security-and-red-teaming/safety-and-alignment-evals/simon-willison-the-lethal-trifecta/index.md) Creator not supplied; see original source. Simon Willison's post on the lethal trifecta: private data, untrusted content and exfiltration make AI agents exploitable. Intermediate · unknown · unknown resource · en - ### [AIxCC finals: Tale of the tape (Trail of Bits)](/security-and-red-teaming/safety-and-alignment-evals/trail-of-bits-aixcc-finals-tale-of-the-tape/index.md) Creator not supplied; see original source. Trail of Bits analysis comparing the cyber reasoning system designs of DARPA AIxCC finalists. Intermediate · unknown · unknown resource · en - ### [vLLM docs: Security](/security-and-red-teaming/safety-and-alignment-evals/vllm-security/index.md) Creator not supplied; see original source. vLLM security documentation: guidance on exposing and hardening self-hosted inference servers. Intermediate · unknown · unknown resource · en - ### [XBOW Blog](/security-and-red-teaming/safety-and-alignment-evals/xbow-autonomous-pentest/index.md) Creator not supplied; see original source. XBOW blog with research posts on autonomous AI penetration testing, vulnerability discovery and exploit validation. Intermediate · unknown · unknown resource · en - ### [MCP docs: Security best practices](/security-and-red-teaming/safety-and-alignment-evals/mcp-security-best-practices-2026-07-28/index.md) Creator not supplied; see original source. MCP security best practices: mitigations for confused deputy, token passthrough and session hijacking attacks. Advanced · unknown · unknown resource · en - ### [Strengthening our defenses against distillation attacks](/security-and-red-teaming/safety-and-alignment-evals/strengthening-our-defenses-against-distillation-attacks/index.md) Creator not supplied; see original source. Anthropic research post on defending against illicit distillation of its models. Advanced · unknown · unknown resource · en - ### [AgentDojo: A Dynamic Environment to Evaluate Prompt Injection Attacks and Defenses for LLM Agents](/security-and-red-teaming/safety-and-alignment-evals/agentdojo-2/index.md) Creator not supplied; see original source. arXiv paper (2024) introducing AgentDojo, an environment for evaluating prompt injection attacks and defences on tool agents. Expert · unknown · unknown resource · en - ### [AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents](/security-and-red-teaming/safety-and-alignment-evals/agentharm-2/index.md) Creator not supplied; see original source. arXiv paper (2024) introducing AgentHarm, a benchmark measuring harmful task completion by LLM agents. Expert · unknown · unknown resource · en - ### [Defeating Prompt Injections by Design (CaMeL)](/security-and-red-teaming/safety-and-alignment-evals/camel-defeating-prompt-injections-by-design/index.md) Creator not supplied; see original source. arXiv paper (2025) by Google DeepMind introducing CaMeL, a capability-based design that defeats prompt injections. Expert · unknown · unknown resource · en - ### [Embrace The Red (Johann Rehberger)](/security-and-red-teaming/safety-and-alignment-evals/embrace-the-red-johann-rehberger/index.md) Creator not supplied; see original source. Embrace The Red, Johann Rehberger's blog documenting prompt-injection and data-exfiltration exploits in real AI agents and IDEs. Expert · unknown · unknown resource · en - ### [The Instruction Hierarchy](/security-and-red-teaming/safety-and-alignment-evals/the-instruction-hierarchy/index.md) Creator not supplied; see original source. arXiv paper (2024) by OpenAI introducing the instruction hierarchy to train models to prioritise privileged instructions. Expert · unknown · unknown resource · en - ### [Universal adversarial attacks (GCG)](/security-and-red-teaming/safety-and-alignment-evals/universal-adversarial-attacks-gcg/index.md) Creator not supplied; see original source. arXiv paper (2023) introducing GCG, universal transferable adversarial suffixes that jailbreak aligned LLMs. Expert · unknown · unknown resource · en [Previous page](/tags/security-red-teaming/index.md) [Plain-text Markdown copy](/tags/security-red-teaming/page/2/index.md)